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The Procedural Due Process Implications of Involuntary State Prisoner Transfers:
Hewitt v. Helms' and Ohm v. Wakinekona 2 — Prisoners' rights have evolved into a discrete
area of law within constitutional due process doctrine. 3 This body of law began with
prisoners deemed "slaves of the state,' and has progressed to a recognition by the United
States Supreme Court that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and
the prisons of this country."' While developments in prisoners' rights have followed
developments in due process clause protections for the general population ,6 such devel-
opments have not been fully extended to prisoners.' Prisoners' due process protections
have not reached the level of those set for members of the general public simply because
prisoners are not members of the general public.' Even though the law on the due process
rights of prisoners has a long history, the issues involved are still far from settled.'
Within the law on prisoners' rights, a separate line of cases concerning prisoner
transfers has evolved. These cases fall into one of two categories: challenges of transfers
to more restrictive custody' and challenges of transfers to other prisons." The Supreme
' 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
• 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
3 See generally Aronson, Prisoners' Rights: Deference and the Declining Role of the Courts in Enforcing
the Rights of Prisoners, 1982 ANN. SURV, Am. L. 79, 79-106 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Aronson,
Prisoners' Rights) (overview discussion of prisoners' rights). Due process protection arises from the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The fifth amendment provides in
relevant part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . .." U.S. CoNs-r. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part: "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. .." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
• Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
• Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-69 (1974).
6 See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (termination of driver's license); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (revocation of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (wage garnishment).
▪ See infra text accompanying notes 167-202 for a discussion of the historical progression of
prisoners' rights.
• One court has stated:
[T]he most striking aspect of prison, in terms of Fourteenth Amendment litigation, is
that prison is a complex of physical arrangements and of measures, all wholly govern-
ment, or wholly performed by agents of government, which determine the total exis-
tence of certain human beings (except perhaps in the realm of the spirit, and inevitably
there as well) from sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, silent, working,
playing, viewing, eating, voiding, reading, alone, with others. It is not so, with members
of the general adult population. State governments have not undertaken to require
members of the general adult population to rise at a certain hour, retire at a certain
hour, eat at certain hours, live for periods with no companionship whatever, wear
certain clothing, or to submit to oral or anal searches after visiting hours, nor have state
governments undertaken to prohibit members of the general adult population from
speaking to one another, wearing beards, embracing their spouses, or corresponding
with their lovers.
Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wisc. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 1335, 1344 (7th Cir.
1973).
See generally Project, Prisoners' Rights Annual Review, 70 GEO. L.J. 815, 815-34 (1981) (survey of
current developments in prisoners' rights).
Fierro v. MacDougal, 685 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1982); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287,
1290 (6th Cir. 1980).
" Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1092 (7th Cir. 1982); Gorham v. Hutto, 667 F.2d 1146, 1148
(4th Cir. 1981); Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F.2d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980).
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Court recently rendered two decisions concerning involuntary prisoner transfers, one
representing each category.,In Hewitt v. Helms, 12 the prisoner claimed an infringement of
due process rights when transferred into solitary confinement, allegedly without a proper
hearing.' 3 In Ohm v. Wakinekona, 14 the inmate charged that his transfer to a prison in a
distant state violated his due process rights.'s The central issue in these two cases was
whether the prisoner possessed a substantive right, emanating either from the Constitu-
tion or from state law, which could not be taken from him absent procedural due process
protections.t 6 In each case, the inmate argued that although the state possessed the power
to make the transfer, it had not provided him with required procedural protections
before the transfer.' 7 The inmates relied on the due process clause protection of liberty in
their claims for relief." In each case, however, the Court found that no liberty interest was
infringed by the transfer. 13
In both Helms and Ohm, the Supreme Court ruled that involuntary prison transfers
did not violate due process requirements. 20 The Court in Helms found that a substantive
liberty interest had been created by state law." Upon deciding that a liberty interest did
exist, the Court was obligated to then decide whether the requirements of due process
had been met." In turning to the second step of its analysis, however, an examination of
the procedures provided, the Court held that the procedures afforded Helms before his
transfer satisfied the due process clause." In Ohm, the Court found no substantive liberty
interest existed." As a result, the Court did not consider whether the procedures in
question satisfied due process."
Helms and Ohm both evince the current attitude of the Court towards prisoners' rights
cases. In both cases, a majority of the Court found no liberty interest to be created by the
due process clause itself, thereby narrowing this source of procedural protection for the
prisoner." In Helms, the majority, after finding a liberty interest created by state law
present, found the adequate level of procedural protection to be lower than in the
prisoners' rights cases of a decade ago. 27 The Ohm Court continued this limiting trend by
finding no liberty interest rooted in state law to be present."
This casenote attempts to develop an understanding of the Court's present treatment
of involuntary prisoner transfers." The first section of the casenote will outline the
12 459 U.S. at 460.
j3
 Id. at 462.
' 4 461 U.S. at 239.
" Id. at 240.
'" Helms, 459 U.S. at 466; Ohm, 461 U.S. at 243-44.
17 Helms, 459 U.S. at 466; Olim, 461 U.S. at 243.
18
 Helms, 459 U.S. at 466; Ohm, 461 U.S. at 243.
' 9 Helms, 459 U.S. at 476; Ohm, 461 U.S. at 251.
2" Helms, 459 U.S. at 476; Ohm, 461 U.S. at 251.
21 Helms, 459 U.S. at 472.
22 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
23
 Helms, 459 U.S. at 476.
24 Ohm, 461 U.S. at 251.
25 Id.
26 Helms, 459 U.S. at 468; Ohm, 461 U.S. at 248.
27
 Helms, 459 U.S. at 476.
28 .02im, 461 U.S. at 249.
" This casenote focuses on the doctrine of procedural due process as applied to involuntary
prisoner transfers. Some prisoners' rights cases are also brought under a substantive due process
. theory. Regarding such cases, the courts apply an analysis similar to the one applied in equal
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Court's opinions in the two most recent decisions on the issue, Helms and 0/im.3° In the
second section, the current status of the due process rights of the prisoner facing an
involuntary transfer will be explained. 3 ' This section of the casenote first briefly traces the
major developments in prisoners' rights law from the "hands off" era up to the begin-
nings of the due process expansion of the early 1970's. 32 Next, the second section will
discuss the first step in the two step process the Court uses to analyze prisoners' rights
cases: the determination of whether a substantive liberty interest exists. The major cases
since 1970 which have developed the notion of a liberty interest rooted in the due process
clause also will be analyzed. 33 In addition, the major cases since 1970 which have devel-
oped the concept of a liberty interest created by state law will be discussed. 34 The second
section will conclude with an analysis of how the Helms and Ohm decisions have affected
the existing law regarding prisoner transfers." Finally, the third section of the casenote
will discuss the second step in the Court's analysis: determining the procedural process
due the transferred prisoner after a liberty interest is found." The casenote submits that
with its decisions in Helms and Ohm the Court has severely restricted the constitutional due
process protections of a powerless individual — the transferred prisoner.
I. THE COURT'S DECISIONS IN HEW/TT V. HELMS AND GUM V. WAKINEKONA
A. Hettritt v. Helms
In 1978, Aaron Helms was serving a term in the State Correctional Institute at
Huntington, Pennsylvania. 37 On December 3, 1978, a riot occurred during which a group
of prisoners attempted to seize the prison's "control center." 38 Several hours after officers
and prison officials had quelled the riot, state police removed Helms from his cell,
questioned him about his role in the riot, and then placed him in "administrative
confinement.""
The next day, prison officials gave Helms a "misconduct report" charging him with
assaulting an officer and taking part in the riot, and detailing the institution's disciplinary
hearing procedure. 4° A "hearing committee" consisting of three prison officials convened
protection cases, that is, an application of tests ranging from "strict scrutiny" to "rational basis." See
Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 235-41 (3rd Cir. 1980); Henak, Prisoners' Rights, 1981 ANN. SuRv.
L. 291, 292 n.7 (1981). For a discussion of the overlap between substantive and procedural due
process, see Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89, 94-95
nn.22-29 (1974).
3° See infra notes 37-166 and accompanying text,
31 See infra notes 167-351 and accompanying text.
32 See.infra notes 167-202 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 203.87 and accompanying text
34 See infra notes 288-351 and accompanying text.
as See infra notes 246-87, 319-51 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 352-83 and accompanying text.
" Helms, 459 U.S. at 462 (1983).
" Id. at 463.
" Id. at 463-64. The Court noted that Pennsylvania regulations establish two types of restricted
housing — disciplinary and administrative segregation. According to the Court, disciplinary segrega-
tion may be imposed when an inmate is found to have committed a misconduct violation, whereas
administrative segregation may be imposed when an inmate poses a threat to security, when
disciplinary charges are pending, or when an inmate requires protection. Id. at 461 n.l. For the
purposes of' its opinion, the Court assumed that the two types of confinement were identical. Id.
4° Id. at 464.
1090	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:1087
four days later to consider the charges against Hein's.' The committee made no finding
of guilt at. t his time, clue to "insufficient information." The committee then ordered that
Helms be kept. in administrative confinement." Three days after the hearing, the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania filed state criminal charges of assault. and riot. against. Helms."
Three weeks later, a "program review committee" consisting of three prison officials
reviewed Helms' confinement and concluded that he should remain in segregation until
further proceedings were held."
On January 19, 1979, prison officials issued Helms a second misconduct report.,
charging him with assault on another officer in the riot." Three days later a hearing
committee composed of three prison officials heard testimony from one guard and
Helms." Based on this evidence, the' committee found Helms guilty of assault and
ordered him confined to disciplinary segregation for six months, effective December 3,
1978."
Helms filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania claiming denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment." Helms
sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against Lowell D. Hewitt., the
Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Huntington, Pennsylvania, and
other prison officials on the theory that he was placed in administrative confinement for
51 days without adequate procedural safeguards." The district court granted summary
judgment to the prison officials, and Helms appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 5°
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, concluding that
Helms' segregation and continuation in administrative custody infringed upon a pro-
tected liberty interest." The court reasoned that Pennsylvania had created a liberty
interest by promulgating comprehensive regulations governing prison operations in
general and administrative segregation in particular." According to the court, Helms'
liberty interest. was impinged because he was not afforded a hearing within a reasonable
time of his initial confinement to determine whether his detention was proper. 53
Hewitt and the other prison officials appealed the Third Circuit's decision to the
Supreme Court of the United States.'" In a five to four decision, the Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals. 55 The Court found that although the relevant Pennsyl-
4 ' Id. The Court was unable to determine from the record whether Helms was present at this
hearing. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 465.
" Id Helms was seen by the committee as "a danger to staff and to other inmates if released
back into the general population." Id. In addition, Helms was to be arrainged the next day on state
criminal charges, and his role in the riot was still under investigation. Id.
45 Id.
Id.
47 Id .
48 Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 489 (3rd Cir. 1981), rev'd, 459 U.S. 460, 478 (1983).
" Helms, 655 F.2d at 489.
Id.
51 Id. at 497.
52 Id. at 496.
" Id. at 500.
s° Helms, 459 U.S. at 462.
" Id. at 478.
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vania statutes did create a liberty interest protected by the due process clause, the
procedures afforded Helms satisfied constitutional requirements."
In its examination of the case, the Court identified two possible sources of substantive
liberty interests — the due process clause itself and state law, 57 The Court rejected Helms'
argument that the Constitution provided him a liberty interest in remaining in the
general prison population." In reaching its decision, the Court noted that prison adminis-
trators are given broad discretion because of the difficulties inherent in managing a
prison and that prisoners retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests." To
support its first contention, the Court cited an earlier opinion dealing with prisoners'
rights in which it stated that deference to prison officials was necessary to avoid placing a
"wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison
administrators" under judicial review.'" The Court supported its second contention by
citing a number of its earlier decisions stating the principle that the due process clause is
not violated as long as the conditions of a prisoner's confinement are within the sentence
imposed on the prisoner and do not otherwise violate the Constitution."
In applying these principles derived from past decisions to the case before it, the
Court held that no liberty interest from within the due process clause itself existed in
Helms' case." According to the Court, administrative segregation has a variety of uses 63 —
protecting the prisoner,64 protecting other prisoners, 65 breaking up disruptive groups,'"
or simply separating inmates awaiting classification or transfer." Administrative segrega-
tion, the Court found, is something every prisoner can expect to face at some point in his
imprisonment," and was therefore within the terms of Helms' sentence."
Having rejected the federal constitutional argument, the Court next turned to
Helms' claim that Pennsylvania had created a liberty interest in his case by enacting
statutes and regulations governing the use of administrative segregation." The Court first
drew a distinction between this case and its earlier decisions in which a state-created
liberty interest had been found." The Court concluded that in those cases where liberty
interests rooted in state law were found, radical changes in the nature of the custody were
at issue. 72 In Helms' case, by contrast, the Court found that the relevant state law
" Id. at 477.
57 Id. at 466.
" Id. at 468.
" Id. at 467.
" Helms, 459 U.S. at 467 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)).
61 Helms, 459 U.S. at 467-68. The Court relied on Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442
U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557 (1974).
62 Id.
63 To support this proposition, the Court cited CHAPTER 37 of the PA. CODE § 95 (1979)
(governing correctional institutions).
6' 37 PA. CODE § 95.104(3) (1979).
65 Id.
" Id.
67 37 PA. CODE § 95.106(1) (1979).
" Helms, 459 U.S. at 468.
" Id.
'° Id. at 469.
T` Id. The Court cited the earlier cases of Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
" The interests involved in those cases were the transfer to a mental hospital in Vilek, 445 U.S. at
482-83; parole possibilities in Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 3; and good time credits in Wolff, 418 U.S. at
546.
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governed the daily operation of the prison system — the use of administrative segrega-
tion." While warning that this distinction could warrant different treatment for Helms'
claim, the Court nonetheless concluded that Helms did acquire a protected liberty interest
in remaining in the general prison population from the Pennsylvania regulations in-
volved." The Court reasoned that Pennsylvania went beyond simple procedural guide-
lines by using mandatory language requiring that certain procedures "shall," "will," and
" must" be employed." In addition, the Court noted, the regulations provided that
administrative segregation would not occur absent specified substantive predicates —"the
need for control," or "the threat of a serious disturbance.""
Finding a protected liberty interest, the Court then considered whether the process
afforded Helms satisfied the due process clause." The Court acknowledged that the
requirements of due process are flexible and dependent on the particular situation."
Applying the balancing approach developed in Mathews v. Eldridge," it ruled that the due
process requirements were satisfied in this case. 8° The Eldridge Court considered the
private interests at stake, the government interests involved, and the value of additional
procedural requirements.' Regarding the first factor, the Court concluded that Helms
had a low level of private interest in the matter. 82 The majority noted that Helms was
merely transferred from one restrictive environment to a more restrictive one, with no
stigma attached and no effect on parole opportunity." Effecting the transfer, on the
other hand, promoted the state's interest in protecting the prison guards and other
prisoners as well as Helms himself." Finally, addressing the third factor, the Court found
that additional procedures would have little effect because the decision to place an inmate
in administrative confinement requires very subjective decisionmaking by prison adminis-
trators."
In turning to the actual procedures provided for Helms, the Court held that due
" Helms, 459 U.S. at 469-70.
74 Id. al 470-71.
Id. at 471-72.
An inmate may be temporarily confined to Close or Maximum Administrative Custody
in an investigative status upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution where
it has been determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance, or a serious threat
to the individual or others. The inmate shall be notified in writing as soon as possible
that he is under investigation and that he will receive a hearing if any disciplinary action
is being considered after the investigation is completed. An investigation shall begin
immediately to determine whether or not a behavior violation has occurred. If no
behavior violation has occurred, the inmate must be released as soon as the reason for
the security concern has abated but in all cases within ten days.
37 PA. Cons 95.104(6)(3).
76 Helms, 459 U.S. at 471-72,
77 Id. at 472.
" Id. Helms was given written notice of the charges against him and his transfer was reviewed by
a hearing committee five days after he was placed in administrative segregation. Id. at 477.
79
 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The due process issue in Mathews was whether an evidentiary hearing
was required prior to termination of Social Security disability benefits payments. Id. at 349. The
Court found no hearing to be required, using the formula outlined above. See id. at 335.
" Helms, 459 U.S. at 477.
" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
82 Helms, 459 U.S. at 473.
47 Id.
84 Id.
" Id. at 473-74.
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process was satisfied," Helms had received notice of the charges against him five days
before the hearing committee reviewed the existing evidence against him." According to
the Court, an informal, nonadversary review was sufficient both for the decision that
Helms was a security threat and for the decision to confine him in administrative segrega-
tion pending completion of an investigation."
Justice Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority." The
Court was correct, justice Blackmun asserted, in finding that while the due process clause
itself did not hold a liberty interest, state law had created a liberty interest in Helms' case."
To support this proposition, Justice Blackmun pointed to earlier decisions of the Court
which dealt with state-created liberty interests. 9 ' Justice Blackmun dissented from the
majority, however, in its discussion of whether Helms had been given due process. 92
Without explaining his reasoning, Justice Blackmun stated that he could not agree with
the Court that the procedures provided Helms satisfied due process. 93
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, dissented." Justice
Stevens objected to the majority's view that Helms' liberty interest was created by state
law." According to Justice Stevens, Helms' liberty interest existed apart from the relevant
written regulations. 96 The severity of Helms' transfer, in his view; impaired Helms'
"residuum of liberty" as a prisoner and triggered due process safeguards." Justice
Stevens interpreted the state regulations as an indication of the State's recognition of the
substantiality of the deprivation, but not as the source of Helms' liberty interest,"
Turning to the procedures necessary to protect Helms' liberty interest, Justice Ste-
vens again disagreed with the majority's conclusions. 99 Justice Stevens conceded that
important government interests may be at stake in initially deciding to contain a prisoner
in administrative confinernent.m According to Justice Stevens, however, more than the
majority's minimal review procedures should be required to confine an inmate in-
definitely.'°' He would require a periodic review at which the prisoner is allowed to make
an oral statement about the need for, and consequences of, continued confinement.'" In
addition, should the prison administrators decide to continue to confine the inmate in
administrative segregation, Justice Stevens would require the administrators to file a brief
written statement supporting that decision and to provide that statement to the pris-
oner.'" These procedures, in Justice Stevens' view, would protect against arbitrary con-
tinuation in administrative confinement.'"
86 Id. at 477.
87
 Id.
"" Id. at 476.
" Id. at 478 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 478-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81 Id. at 479 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id.
93 Id.
" Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98
 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
'" Id. at 491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
102 Id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304 Id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In summary, then, Helms was successful in his claim that a liberty interest existed in
his case, protected by the due process clause.'" He was unsuccessful, however, in obtain-
ing any further relief.'" The Court found no liberty interest present from the due
process clause itself, but did find that Pennsylvania had created a liberty interest with its
comprehensive prison regulations governing administrative transfers.'" In the majority's
view, the informal, nonadversary review provided Helms satisfied the requirements of the
due process clause.'" The issue of whether a state prisoner had been denied a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest was again addressed by the Court just months after the
Helms decision, in Olim v. Wakinekona,' a case involving the transfer of a prisoner to a
prison in a distant state.
B. Olim v. Wakinekona
In 1976, Delbert Kaahanui Wakinekona was an inmate of the Hawaii State Prison,
sentenced to life imprisonment and confined to the maximum control unit."° On August
2, Wakinekona appeared before a board designated as the "program committee" of the
prison for a hearing. " The purpose of this hearing was to determine the reason for
failure of programs at the maximum control unit." 2 Three days later, the committee
notified Wakinekona in writing that he would be given a further hearing to determine his
program designation, which included a possible transfer to a prison on the mainland." 3
On August 10, the second hearing was held before the same members of the program
committee."4 The following day the committee rendered its decision, and provided
Wakinekona with a written copy."' The committee recommended that Wakinekona
remain classified as a maximum security risk and that he be transferred to a prison on the
mainland.'" On the authority of this administrative decision and its acceptance by the
prison administrator, Wakinekona was then transferred to Folsom State Prison in Cali-
fornia." 7
Wakinekona sought relief in the federal district court of Hawaii, claiming that prison
officials had violated his constitutional right to procedural due process.'" Wakinekona
argued that he was denied a hearing by a fair and impartial hoard because the transfer
recommendation was made by the same members of the program committee which sent
him to the hearing, in violation of state regulations.'" The district court held that a liberty
' 1)5 Helms, 459 U.S. at 472.
'" Id. at 477.
107 Id. at 472.
1°" Id. at 477.
165 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
"0 Olim , 461 U.S. at 240.
"' Id.
Hz Id.
"3 Id.
'" Id. at 241.
Id.
" 8 Id.
"7 Id.
"" Wakinekona v. Doi, 421 F. Supp. 83, 84 (D. Hawaii 1976), rev'd, Olim v. Wakinekona, 459 F.
Supp. 473 (1). Hawaii 1978), rev'd, 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
"3 Doi, 421 F. Supp. at 85. Article IV of the'Hawaii "Supplementary Rules and Regulations of
the Corrections Division," entitled "The Classification Process," declares that "classification is in-
tended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community." The inmate is
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interest involving a right to a hearing before a fair and impartial board had been created
by the regulations of the state of Hawaii.'" Because the same committee that had singled
Wakinekona out as a disruptive inmate also ruled on his transfer, the court held that his
right to due process had been violated and ordered a new hearing before an impartial
board . 121
On request by the defendants to reconsider their original motion to dismiss
Wakinekona's complaint, the district court reversed itself.' 22 In light of a recently released
First Circuit opinion,'" the district court held that regulations, as opposed to state
statutes, do not create the kind of substantive interest required to establish a state-created
"liberty" interest.' 24
Wakinekona appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 125 The Ninth Circuit disagreed
with other circuits which had held that prison transfer regulations do not create a liberty
interest protected by the due process clause unless the events which cause the transfer are
specified in the regulations.'" The relevant question, according to the Ninth Circuit, was
whether the transfer regulations create an entitlement to procedural protections.'" In
Wakinekona's case, the circuit court stated, the substantive content of the regulations
involved created a justifiable expectation that he would not be transferred absent the
specified procedure.'" This expectation, according to the Ninth Circuit, created a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest.'"
Olim and the other prison officials involved petitioned the United States Supreme
granted the right to appear during the Program Committee hearing "if a change, modification, or
transfer is planned which would result in a grievous loss." The "impartial Program Committee [is to
be] composed of at least three members who were not actively involved in the process by which the
inmate/ward was brought before the Committee." Ohm, 461 U.S. at 242 n. 1 . In Ohm, the state
conceded that Wakinekona suffered a "grievous loss" within the meaning of the statute. Ohm, 461
U.S. at 242 n.2.
1" Doi, 421 F. Supp. at 85.
121 Id.
i" Ohm, 459 F. Supp. at 473-76.
l" Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1977).
144
	 459 F. Supp. at 475. The court relied on the fact that the Hawaii state regulations do
not govern the discretion of the administrator in ultimately deciding on a transfer. As a result,
according to the court, no liberty interest was created. Without a liberty interest, due process did not
attach, hence Wakinekona no longer had a claim in federal court and his complaint was dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Id. at 475-76.
' 25 Ohm, 664 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 242, 251.
"6 Id. at 711. The court cited the First, Second, and Sixth Circuit decisions of Lombardo v.
Meachum, 548 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1977); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F.2d 934, 938 (2d Cir. 1979); Bills
v. Manson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (6th Cir. 1980).
1" Ohm, 664 F.2d at 711.
t" Id. at 711-12. The "substantive content" referred to by the court was the procedural protec-
tions found in the regulations: that transfers involving a grievous loss be considered by an impartial
committee, that the prisoner be given prior notice of the hearing at which the committee will
consider his transfer, that the notice state what the committee will consider at the hearing and any
recent specific facts which may weigh significantly in the classification process, that the prisoner have
the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses, the right to retain counsel, and the right to offer
evidence on his own behalf. In addition, the regulations require that the committee "render a
recommendation based only upon evidence presented at the hearing to which the individual had an
opportunity to respond or any evidence which may subsequently come to light after the formal
hearing." Id.
'" Id.
1096	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:1087
Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted."° The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the transfer did not deprive Wakinekona of any liberty interest in violation
of his constitutional due process rights. 131 In the majority opinion, written by Justice
Blackmun and joined by five other Justices, the Court found that no liberty interest had
been created by either the due process clause or the state regulations of Hawaii."'
First, the Court addressed t he issue of whether an interstate prison transfer deprives
an inmate of any liberty interest protected by the due process clause itself.' The Court
acknowledged its holding in Wolff v. McDonnell m that prisoners retain a residuum of
liberty, but relied on two later companion cases to repudiate the notion that any grievous
loss inflicted upon a prisoner by t he state necessarily implicates the due process clause.'"
According to the Court, Meachum v. Fano'" and Montanye v. Haymes," 7 which dealt with
intrastate transfers, stood for the proposition that an inmate has no justifiable expectation
that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a state." From this interpreta-
tion of these cases, the Court reasoned that Wakinekona had no justifiable expectation
that he would be incarcerated in any particular state.' 39 The Court pointed to overcrowd-
ing, the need to separate particular prisoners, and "any number of reasons" as sometimes
necessitating interstate transfers.'"
The Court distinguished the instant case from Vitek v. Jones,' where the Court held
that the transfer of an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital did implicate a liberty
interest.'" The distinguishing factor in Vitek, the Court noted, was that IpThicement in
the mental hospital was not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a
prison sentence subjects an individual, because it brought about 'consequences . .
qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person con-
victed of crime.'"143 By contrast, the Court stated that Wakinekona's transfer, even
though it involved great distance and an ocean crossing, differed from an intrastate
transfer only in degree, not in kind. 144 Invoking the rule of Meachum v. Fano that the
"determining factor is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight," the
Court held that no liberty interest was present.'"
Having concluded that no liberty interest existed from the due process clause itself,
the Court turned to state law." The Court reversed the court of appeals' holding that the
Hawaii prison regulations created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.' 47 The
Court relied on previous decisions, where it held no state-created liberty existed because
' 3° Ohm, 461 U.S. at 243 -44.
131 Id. at 251.
132 Id.
13' Id. at 244.
' 34
 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
' 35 Ohm, 461 U.S. at 244.
'" 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
1 " 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
Montanye, 427 U.S. at 243; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224.
Otim, 461 U.S. at 245.
' 4° Id. at 246.
11
 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
142 Id. at 494.
'" Ohm, 461 U.S. at 245 (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493).
044 Id. at 247 -48.
"5 Id. (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224).
146 Ohm, 461 U.S. at 248.
"4 Id. at 249.
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there were no substantive limitations on official discretionary power to transfer.'" In
Wakinekona's case, the Court noted the prison administrator was the final decisionmaker
regarding the transfer, and his discretion is "completely unfettered."'° Without a sub-
stantive limitation placed on official discretion, the Court stated no liberty interest entitled
to protection under the due process clause was created. 15°
The Court did not accept the reasoning of the court of appeals that the prison
regulations required a particular kind of hearing before the administrator could exercise
his discretion. 151 On this point, the Court stated that "process is not an end in itself," and a
"liberty interest is of course a substantive interest of an individual; it cannot he the right to
demand needless formality. "152
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented.'" In Justice Marshall's view,
Wakinekona did have a substantive liberty interest in remaining in a Hawaii prison.' 54
Wakinekona's transfer, according to Justice Marshall, was not "within the range of
conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual."'" In Justice
Marshall's view, such a drastic change implicates a substantive liberty interest which
cannot be taken from a prisoner absent the protections of the due process clause.'"
justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the Hawaii prison
regulations did not create a liberty interest in Helms' case.'" According to Justice Mar-
shall, earlier cases demonstrated the principle that state laws which impose substantive
criteria limiting the discretion of prison officials create a protected liberty interest.'"
Conversely, Justice Marshall stated, state laws imposing no conditions on administrative
discretion do not create a liberty interest. 159 In Justice Marshall's view, the Hawaii prison
regulations, by providing that transfers would only take place if required to ensure an
inmate's optimum placement, restricted official discretion in ordering transfers.' 6° Ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, these regulations created a liberty interest protected by the
due process clause.'"'
In summary, the Ohm majority denied that a liberty interest protected by the due
process clause existed in Wakinekona's case.'" The Ohm Court rejected both state law and
Montanye, 427 U.S. at 243; Meachum, 472 U.S. at 226-28.
1" Ohm, 461 U.S. at 249. In deciding that the administrator's discretion is completely unfet-
tered, the Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw.
138, 144-45, 621 P.2d 976, 980-81 (1981). Ohm, 461 U.S. at 249.
' 5° Ohm, 461 U.S. at 249.
'" Id. at 250.
1 " Id.
b" Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined Part I of Justice Marshall's opinion,
arguing that Wakinekona's transfer implicated a liberty interest protected by the due process clause
itself. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
751 Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 252 (quoting Vitek, 455 U.S. at 493) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1" Ohm, 461 U.S. at 253 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 57 Id. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited the Supreme Court decisions of
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); and the district court opinion in Wright v. Economoto, 462
F. Supp, 397 (N.U. Cal. 1976), swam. aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
'" Ohm, 461 U.S. at 253 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 258-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 " Ohm, 461 U.S. at 251.
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the due process clause as sources of a liberty interest for Wakinekona. 163 In Wakinekona's
situation, the Court saw nothing to protect. The combination of the lack of state law and
the ability of officials to transfer a prisoner for whatever reason or for no reason at all left
Wakinekona, in the Court's view, without a remedy."'
The Ohm decision differed from the decision in Helms in that, in Helms, the Court did
find that a liberty interest had been created by state law. 165
 Nonetheless, Helms was left in
the same position as Wakinekona at the end of his litigation — without relief, because in
his case the Court decided that he had been provided the minimum requirements of due
process. 164
The Helms and Ohm decisions reflect a developing policy of the Court to narrow the
procedural due process protections of prisoners. This casenote will now look at the
development of the law on prisoner transfers, beginning with a brief summary of the
historical background of prisoners' rights cases.
II. THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF INVOLUNTARY PRISONER TRANSFERS
A. A Brief History of the Treatment of Prisoners'
Rights Claims in American Courts
The traditional approach of the American courts regarding prisoners' rights was a
"hands off""7
 policy towards claims brought by prisoners, simply a blanket refusal to
grant the prisoner jurisdiction.''" The rationale for this approach rested on two assump-
tions. First, courts declined to decide cases involving prisoners' rights because of a widely
accepted view that courts lacked the expertise to deal with prison conditions.' 69 Second,
due process claims brought by prisoners were not favored because courts feared that
judicial review of the decisions of prison officials would result in subverting the control of
prison administrators.'"
The Supreme Court formulated its approach during the "hands off" period by
distinguishing between the rights and privileges of prisoners.' 71
 A criminal conviction,
according to the Court, terminated the rights of a prisoner, leaving only the privileges
granted by the state.' 72
 This reasoning allowed the Court to dismiss the claims of prisoners
166 Id.
1" Id. at 250 -51.
165 Helms, 459 U.S. at 472.
"6 Id. at 477.
"7
 The "hands off" terminology is generally credited with having originated in Fritch, Civil
Rights of Federal Inmates 31 (1961) (document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
1 " During this period the Supreme Court reviewed just four cases involving actions brought by
inmates: Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1948); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 258
(1942); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548 (1941); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21 (1919).
Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HAs .risics CoNsT.
L.Q. 219, 221 n.7 (1977). See also Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA.
L. REV. 795, 812 (1969).
168
	 Searching fora Liberty Interest: The Prisoner's Right to Due Process, 61 NEB. L. REV. 382, 382
n.1 (1982).
"G For a detailed discussion of the "hands off" policy, see generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALF. L.J. 506 (1963)
(criticism of hands oft doctrine and proposal for abandonment).
"' See, e.g., Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1908) (granting of parole is a
privilege, state may use discretion or attach conditions as it sees fit).
1"
 According to this analysis the due process clause has no effect upon a state-granted privilege.
Id.
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because there were no rights left to protect. 173 The Court employed the "hands off"
doctrine for prisoners' rights analysis until the early 1960's.' 74
The Federal courts began to show a willingness to discard the "hands off" approach
in the early 1960's.' 75 Developments in two other areas of the law weakened the "hands
off" policy.' 76 The first of these developments was the increased protection the Court
began to provide the accused from police and prosecutors.' 77 Ignoring completely the
claims of prisoners no longer appeared rational after prisoners were granted due process
protection at all earlier stages of their incarceration. 178
In 1961, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the hundred year old Civil Rights
Act in a case involving police misconduct by holding that a private right of action existed
to provide a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities
by a state official's abuse of discretion.''" The Court made this right of action available to
prisoners in 1964.'" Through these decisions, the Civil Rights Act became a vehicle for
state prisoners to air their grievances in federal court by claiming their constitutional
rights had been violated by state prison officials acting under color of state law.'"
In the 1970's, the Burger Court began an expansion of procedural due process rights
for individuals.'" In these cases, the Court developed the idea that to satisfy procedural
requirements of due process, some kind of hearing is required before a person can be
deprived of property.'" The Court imputed a hearing requirement to property interests
of the average free person: wages,' welfare payments,'" and household goods,'" in
what has been termed a "due process explosion."'" With its decision in Morrissey v. Brewer,
'" See id. at 488. For a criticism of the rights and privileges distinction, see Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 196 (1971). See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right -Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1459 (1968). "Holmes himself readily admitted that to
deny that a person had a 'right' to something was merely to announce the conclusion that a court
would not give him any relief; but the denial itself provides no reason whatsoever why such relief
should be denied." Id.
174 For a history of the demise of the "hands off" doctrine, see Calhoun, The Supreme Court and
the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS	 L.Q. 219, 220 (1977).
18 Some of the first cases rejecting the "hands off" doctrine: Fulwood v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d
171, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124, 128 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
"" Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 175, 183-85 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Goldfarb, Prisoners' Grievances].
1 " See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 467 (1966) (voluntary confessions); Escohedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961)
(exclusionary rules).
"8 Goldfarb, Prisoners' Grievances, supra note 176, at 184.
"8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
I" Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546.
181 See generally Note, Prisoners, 1983, and the Federal Judge as Warden, 9 Tot,. L. Rev. 873 (1978)
(ever increasing volume of prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement under section
1983).
"" See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("It is hardly useful any longer to try
to deal with this problem [parolee facing revocation of parole] in terms of whether the parolee's
liberty is a 'right' or a `privilege.' By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Burger, C.J. majority opinion)).
See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Friendly, Hearing] (discussion of the development of the hearing requirement and the
elements of a fair hearing).
' Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
'" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
I" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
"7 Friendly, Hearing, supra note 183, at 1268 n.169.
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the Court carried the requirement of a hearing into prisoners' rights cases.'"" In Morrissey,
the parolees complained of a denial of due process when their parole was revoked without
a hearing.'" The Court applied, for the first time in a prisoners' rights case,' 9° a "grievous
loss" approach to determine whether the parolees were entitled to due process protec-
tion.' 9 ' Under this analysis, procedural protections are due only to the individual who had
suffered a grievous loss.'"2 In Morrissey the Court found that the revocation of parole does
inflict a grievous loss upon a person.'" In the Court's view, a parolees' liberty, whether
termed a "right" or a "privilege," was a liberty within the protection of the due process
clause.'"
The grievous loss approach tended to overlook fundamental differences involved
between free individuals and prisoners, and that incarceration in prison itself, by most
definitions, is a "grievous loss."'" In Meachum v. Fano' the Court switched to what has
been termed an "entitlement test"'" 7 to determine whether procedural due process pro-
tections are applicable.'" Under this analysis, a prisoner's due process rights are violated
if he is denied a "liberty interest" to which he is entitled without adequate procedural
protection)" Such a liberty interest can arise in one of two ways: from the due process
clause or from relevant state law.'
The Court currently uses this two pronged approach to determine whether a liberty
interest exists, looking to both the due process clause and state law. This two pronged
approach was applied by the Court to analyze the liberty interests claimed in both Hewitt v.
Helms and Ohm v. Wakinekona."' The next two parts of this casenote will trace these two
sources of liberty interests from their beginnings up to their present status in involuntary
transfer cases as a result of the Court's decisions in Helms and Ohm.'
B. Liberty Interest Direct from the Due Process Clause
The fourteenth amendment itself' may give rise to a liberty interest." Where such a
liberty interest is found, the Supreme Court has established the rule that an individual
may not be deprived of the interest absent procedural due process protections. 204 In the
L" 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972).
1 "9 Id. at 474.
' 9' Id. at 481.
191 The term originated in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
'°2 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
193 Id. at 482.
19.4 Id.
'" See, e.g., Winsett v. McGinnis, 617 F.2d 996, 1004 (1980) ("It is well settled that when a person
is lawfully incarcerated for the conviction of a crime, that person's constitutional rights become
circumscribed.").
"6
 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
"7 Murphy, Due Proce.“ Implications of Prisoner Transfers, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 583, 585-87 (1982).
"9 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27. For a discussion of entitlement theory, see Smolla, The
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35
STAN. L. REV. 69, 72 (1982); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 434-43
(1977).
1" Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 552 (1974); Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226.
2" Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 466 (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27).
201 Helms, 459 U.S. at 466; Ohm, 461 U.S. at 243-44.
202 See infra notes 205-87 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
2" Id.
September 1984]	 CASENOTES	 1101
prisoners' rights context, the discussion of liberty interest direct from the due process
clause began with the Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer and has continued in a line of
cases including Helms and Ohm.
1. The Case Law Preceding Helms and Olim
As discussed previously, in Morissey v. Brewer,2°5 the Court found a liberty interest
present only where the inmate will suffer a "grievous loss."' In that case, the Court
found revocation of parole without a hearing to be such a grievous loss. 207 The Court
reasoned that due process is a flexible concept which requires taking into consideration
the "precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that
has been affected by the government action."2" The Morrissey Court concluded that the
right to parole was protected within the "liberty" language of the fburteenth amendment,
and could not be taken away absent adequate procedural protections. 209 In Morrissey, the
Court also defined what procedures are due once a liberty interest is found. 2" According
to the Court, the minimum requirements of due process include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations;
(b) disclosure of evidence against the individual;
(c) the opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses and documen-
tary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
(e) a neutral and detached hearing body;
(f) a written statement by the factfinder as to evidence relied on and
reasons for the decision. 2 "
Following Morrissey, the Court held that the same due process procedures applicable to
revocation of parole applied to revocation of probation." 2 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the
Court found that the revocation of probation resulted in a loss of liberty equivalent to
revocation of parole, and therefore entitled the prisoner to due process protections. 2"
The Court also extended Morrissey to require the assistance of counsel in the prison
environment."'
Morrissey and Scarpelli represented a dramatic departure from the "hands off"
approach followed by earlier courts. 215 The Court next applied this liberty interest
"5 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
zoe Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
205 Id.
2" Id. at 481 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1965)).
2" Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
210 Id. at 484-90.
2" Id. at 489. See generally Friendly, Hearing, supra note 183; Tobriner 	 Cohen, How Much
Process is "Due"? Parolees and Prisoners, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tobriner &
Cohen, Parolees]. •
212 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
212 Id.
2" Id. at 790 (appointment by counsel made on a case by case basis by decision making
administrators). See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 ("We do not reach or decide the question whether the
parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent.").
215 The Court had progressed from the sheer refusal to even allow the prisoner-plaintiff into
court to a granting of a substantial set of procedural protections upon the finding of a denial of a
liberty interest. See supra text accompanying notes 205-11.
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analysis in both Meachum v. Fano 216 and Montanye v. flaymes,2i7 in which the prisoners
claimed that intrastate prisoner transfers without hearings violated their due process
rights. 2 " Similar to the situation presented in Morrissey, in which the court held that the
due process clause gave rise to, the protected interest, neither case involved any applicable
state statute or regulation governing transfers. 219 In both cases, the Court held that
"intrastate" transfers do not trigger the liberty interest found directly in the due process
clause.220 The Court retreated from its "grievous loss" approach, unwilling to find that any
change in confinement warrants due process protection. 22 '
After Meachum and Montanye, the extent of the liberty interests a prisoner derived
from the due process clause was unclear. Whether Meachum and Montanye represented a
retrenchment of the rule in Morrissey and Scarpelli or only an example of a specific
situation not rising to the constitutional "liberty" level was an open question. One possible
interpretation was that intrastate prison transfers did not involve a protected liberty
interest, but that these decisions did not foreclose later prisoners subject to other types of
transfers from seeking protection under the due process clause. The Court appeared to
sanction the view that Meachum and Montanye applied only to intrastate transfers with its
summary affirmance of Wright v. Enomolo. 222 In Wright, the lower court had limited
Meachum and Montanye to intrastate transfers, and therefore had found them not control-
ling when the transfer in question was a transfer into maximum security segregation for
administrative reasons. 223 The Wright court had found that due process safeguards attach
to such a transfer because it involves a "severe impairment of the residuum of liberty" of
the prisoner. 224
One year after Wright, the Court considered an inmate's challenge of parole proce-
dures in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates. 222 In Greenholtz, the prisoners complained
that the procedures followed by the Nebraska Board of Parole in granting parole did not
satisfy due process requirements. 226 This case provided the Court with a clear opportunity
to find a liberty interest within the due process clause and follow procedural protections
for parole revocation established in Morrissey. The Court, however, chose not to do so.
Instead, it distinguished the prisoners' claim in Greenholtz from the claim in Morrissey and
held that the possibility of parole was not a constitutionally protected liberty interest."'
210
 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
2'7 427 U.S. 236 (1976). See generally Note, No Process Due Prisoners in Intrastate Transfers: Due
Process Imprisoned Within the Entitlement Doctrine, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 561, 561-87 (1977) (analysis of
Meachum and Montanye).
Montanye, 427 U.S. at 237; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 222.
219 See infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text.
22° Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225. The Meachum Court relied on the
argument that because the original conviction allowed the state to place a prisoner in any of its
prisons, the subsequent transfer had no effect. Id., 427 U.S. at 224.
221 Id.
222 462 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976), summ. affd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
223 Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 402.
224 Id.
"' 442 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1979). The prisoners in Greenholtz challenged the parole system itself, unlike
in Morrissey, where the issue presented was a revocation of parole without due process. Id. Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 472. See generally Note, Due Process Behind Bars The Intrinsic Approach, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1067, 1067-1109 (discussion of the Greenholtz decision and its effects on procedural due process
rights of prisoners).
226 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 3-4.
222 Id. at 9-11.
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According to the Court, the prisoners in Morrissey were no longer prisoners but parolees,
whereas in Greenholtz, the prisoners were still in prison but sought parole."' The Court
noted that in Morrissey, the liberty denied was one the prisoners already had, whereas in
Greenholtz, the liberty denied was one the prisoners desired."' In the Court's view, this
difference was the distinguishing factor."'
The Court also decided against the prisoner's claim of a liberty interest arising from
the due process clause in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat. 23 ' In Dumschat, the
inmate claimed that the failure of the Connecticut Board of Pardons to provide him with
a written statement of reasons for repeatedly rejecting his commutation request denied
him due process. 232 The Court relied on the Greenholtz rationale that a critical difference
exists between the denial of a liberty a prisoner has and the denial of liberty the prisoner
desires, ruling that the mere desire of commutation falls within the latter category. 233
Without any substantive liberty interest to protect, the Court concluded, no procedural
protections are required."'
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Dumschat disagreed over whether the
majority limited the independent due process clause liberty interests of the earlier
cases."5 Justice Stevens, in dissent, suggested that the majority had erred by eliminating
the clue process clause as a source of protectible liberty interests."' Justice White, in
concurrence, argued that while no liberty interest was present in Dumschat, the decision
did not imply that all liberty interests entitled to constitutional protection must be found
in state law. 237 Under the White analysis, Dumschat left intact. the due process clause as a
source of protected liberty interests of prisoners. 238
En Vitek v, Jones, the Court affirmatively stated that a prisoner retains rights that will
be protected by due process even absent applicable state law. 23 ' In that case, an inmate
challenged his transfer to a mental hospital on the grounds of lack of adequate notice and
absence of a hearing. 24" While finding a liberty interest rooted in state statutes existed, the
Court stated that even absent relevant state law, the prisoner had been denied procedural
22"
229
230 id.
23 ' 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981).
232 Id. at 461. The Connecticut Board of Pardons had in the past granted approximately
three-fourths of the applications for commutations of life sentences. Id.
233
	
at 464.
2" Id. (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7). The quote from Greenholtz stated:
There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally
released before t he expiration of a valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to
be released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined. But the
conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right , . .
442 U.S. at 7 (emphasis in original).
135 Durnschat, 452 U.S. at 467 (White, J., concurring); Id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23" Durnschat, 452 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 467-68 (White, J., concurring).
"" See id. See also Aronson, Prisoners' Rights, supra note 3, at 93 (agreeing with Justice White that
the majority opinion does not severely limit the scope of protected liberty interest direct from the due
process clause).
"" 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). See generally Comment, Prisoners' Rights: Due Process and Transfers to
Mental Institutions, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 770, 770-84 (1980) (analysis of Vitek and conclusion that it
represents fortification of liberty interest rationale).
no Vitek, 445 U.S. at 484.
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due process."' The Court reasoned that an involuntary transfer to a mental hospital
produces a loss of liberty interest, not simply the loss of freedom resulting from the
prisoner's conviction and subsequent confinement.' Such a transfer may have a possible
stigmatizing effect, the Court stated, and could "engender adverse social consequences to
the individual."'" Before such a transfer could be implemented, the Court held, proce-
dures which satisfy the due process clause must be followed, notably the full range of
procedures outlined in Morrissey . 244 In reaching this conclusion, the Vitek Court held that
determining whether a transfer implicates a liberty interest and therefore is subject to
procedural protection turns on determining whether "[s]uch consequences visited on the
prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a .
person convicted of crime ... [and are] not within the range of conditions of confinement
to which a prison sentence subjects an individual."'" This language from Vitek suggested
that a prisoner has a procedurally protected liberty interest if his transfer subjects him to a
situation not normally imposed upon an inmate.
2. The Helms and Olim Treatment of the Due Process Clause
as a Source of Liberty Interests for Prisoners
Against the backdrop described above, the Court decided Helms and Olim. In light of
the precedent in the prison transfer area, the inmates in both these cases arguably had a
liberty interest originating in the due process clause and were therefore entitled to
procedural protection before being transferred. Neither prisoner, however, succeeded in
his claim for pre-transfer process. In each case the Court appeared to reduce the
procedural protection for the prisoner provided in prior cases.
In Helms, the Court recognized that a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment may arise directly from the due process clause. 296 The Court nonetheless
rejected Helms' liberty interest claim by describing his transfer into solitary confinement
as simply subjecting him to "more austere and restrictive" quarters. 247 Such an approach,
however, underestimates the change in conditions attendant to Helms' transfer.'" While
in administrative confinement, Helms was denied access to vocational, educational, recre-
ational, and rehabilitative programs. 249 He was limited to just a few minutes outside of his
"I Id. at 491.
"f Id. at 492.
Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425.26 (1979)).
294 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-95. See supra text accompanying note 211.
24' Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493.
2"6 Helms, 459 U.S. at 466.
247 Id. at 466.67.
246 See e.g., Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 399. The court stated:
Prisoners in the maximum security units are confined in cells approximately five feet
wide by eight feet long. The cells are without fresh air or daylight, both ventilation arid
lighting being poor. The lights in some cells are controlled by guards. It is difficult for
prisoners to get needed medical attention It is clear, then, that a prisoner confined
in a maximum security unit suffers a loss of liberty much more severe than that
experienced by a prisoner in the general population.
Id. The restrictive nature of Helms' confinement was compounded because he suffered an adminis-
trative confinement as opposed to a disciplinary confinement. Helms, 459 U.S. at 463-64. Administra-
tive confinement subjected Helms to segregation for unclear reasons and an indefinite time period,
unlike the usual disciplinary confinement, which is for a definite offense and a definite period. Id. See
Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 403.
249 Helms, 459 U.S. at 479 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cell each day as opposed to the fourteen hours experienced daily by the general popula-
tion. 25° This hardship could reasonably be described as not being "within the range of
conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual."25 ' The
Court chose not to view Helms' confinement this way, and instead saw it as "the sort of
confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their
incarceration."'
The majority's conclusion that transfer into solitary confinement is reasonably
foreseeable is debatable. As Justice Stevens asserted in dissent, residency in the general
prison population is the institutional norm." A transfer to solitary confinement was not
specified by the terms of Helms' initial criminal sentence, and in Justice Stevens' view,
"[n]ot only is there a disparity, the disparity is drastic."" As Justice Stevens indicated, the
difference in conditions involved in a transfer to solitary confinement infringe on a
prisoner's "residuum of liberty," making procedural due process safeguards necessary."
The majority in Helms relied an Meachum and Montanye to support its decision that
Helms did not have a protected liberty interest arising from the due process clause
itself. 256 The Court interpreted these cases as standing for the proposition that a prison
transfer is unprotected by the due process clause even though the change in facilities
involves a "significant modification" in conditions of confinement.'" Meachum and Mon-
tanye, however, were interpreted by a lower court in Wright as applicable only to intrastate
prison transfers, and not transfers into maximum security." The Supreme Court, by
summarily affirming the Wright decision, appeared to sanction this interpretation.'" As
the Wright court pointed out, the Meachum and Montanye opinions explicitly stated that the
transfer decision in those cases did not result in confinement in maximum security
segregation.'" Before the Helms decision, the Court indicated that an inmate was entitled
to due process protections before suffering an administrative transfer into solitary
confmement. 26 ' The Helms opinion makes clear that no liberty interest exists; absent
relevant state law, a prisoner can be transferred into administrative segregation for any or
no reason. In Helms, the Court did not discuss the significance of its summary affirmance
of Wright when considering whether a liberty interest could arise directly from the due
process clause. The Court did discuss this affirmance later in the opinion when deciding
he issue of a potential state-created liberty interest. 26' Apparently, the majority viewed
255 Id.
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493. See J. ABBOTT, IN THE 13Et.i.v OF THE BEAST 51-62 (1981) ("Solitary
confinement in prison can alter the ontological makeup of a stone."). Id. at 53.
252 Helms, 459 U.S. at 468.
2" Id. at 487 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254 Id.
255 Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Helms, 459 U.S. at 467-68.
2" Id. at 468. The change in conditions involved in Meachum was later defined as being a
"grievous loss" in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 rt.9 (1976).
258 Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 4(12.
225 Wright v. Enomoto, 434 U.S. 1052, 1052 (1978).
266 Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 402 (citing Montanye, 427 U.S. at 236; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 219).
261 The Court appeared to ignore its statement that would be difficult for the purposes of
procedural due process to distinguish between the procedures that are required where good time is
forfeited and those that must be extended when solitary confinement is at issue." Wolff, 418 U.S. at
571 n.19. See also Murphy, Due Process Implications of Prisoner Transfers, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 583, 584
("an important but often neglected footnote").
262 Helms, 459 U.S. at 469.
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the district court's opinion in Wright as a finding of state-created liberty interest only. The
language of the district court, however, would indicate otherwise: "[w]hen a prisoner is
transferred from the general prison population to the grossly more onerous conditions of
maximum security, be it for disciplinary or administrative reasons, there is a severe
impairment of the residuum of liberty which he retains as a prisoner — an impairment
which triggers the requirement for due process safeguards."'" Despite this language, the
Helms Court's reliance on Meachum and Montanye indicates these decisions are not limited
solely to intrastate transfers.
A second type of prisoner transfer — prison to prison — was addressed by the Court
in Ohm v. Wakinekona. 2 " Again, the majority decided that Meachum and Montanye were
controlling. 265 The Court viewed Wakinekona's transfer as differing from an intrastate
transfer in degree, but not in kind.'" Similar to Helms' transfer, according to the Court,
Wakinekona's transfer was "within the normal limits or range of custody - a stale may
impose.' In Meachum and Montanye, the Court had relied on the notion that an intrastate
transfer is within the normal range of confinement because an inmate has no justifiable
expectation he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a state.' In Ohm, the
majority extended this notion by stating that an inmate has no justifiable expectation that
he will he incarcerated in any particular state.'"
The majority rejected Wakinekona's argument that Vitek should control. 57° For Vitek
to govern, Wakinekona would have had to show a change in confinement "qualitatively
different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a
crime."21 ' Absent such a finding, no liberty interest existed and therefore no procedural
protections were due.'" The majority seemed to attach little significance to the severity of
Wakinekona's transfer, even though the transfer involved crossing an ocean and travel-
ling a distance of 4,000 miles, separating him from his family, friends, and counsel.'" In
addition, the transfer placed him in a potentially hostile environment and interrupted his
educational and rehabilitative programs. 274 Such a transfer would appear to cross the line
between differing only in degree to differing in kind.275 In Vitek, the Court found that the
transfer to a mental hospital was not within the inmate's normal conditions of confine-
ment because it was a transfer not characteristically suffered by prisoners.'" As a result,
the Court concluded that the inmate in Vitek was entitled to due process protections
26" Wright, 462 F. Stipp. at 402.
2" 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
"5 Id. at 248.
26' Id. at 247-48.
217 Id. at 247 (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225).
26" Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224; Montanye, 427 U.S. at 243.
2" Ohm, 461 U.S. at 245.
"° Id.
274 Id. (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493).
272 1d.
273 Id. at 248 n.9. An analysis of the injuries suffered by the transferred prisoner is contained in
M illemann & M Rieman n, The Prisoner's Right to Stay Where He Is: State and Federal Transfer Compacts
Run Afoul of Constitutional Due Process, 3 CAP. U.L. REV. 223, 229-34 (1974).
274 Ohm, 461 U.S. at 248 n.9.
273 The majority defined Wakinekona's transfer as the legal equivalent of the intrastate transfers
in Meachum and Montanye, the difference only a "matter of degree, not of kind." Ohm, 461 U.S. at
247-48. The Court relied on the language of Meachum that "the determining factor is the nature of
the interest involved rather than its weight." Id. at 248 (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224).
276 See supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
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before such a transfer could be macle.' 77 Because transfers of such magnitude as
Wakinekona's are not characteristically suffered by prisoners, the same reasoning could
have been applied in his case. 2"
The majority, however, chose not to make .this analysis.m 4 In effect, Wakinekona has
been "banished" from his homeland, a punishment considered historically to be among
the severest. 2" The majority found this argument unpersuasive, stating that Wakineko-
na's conviction, and not his transfer, kept him from inhabiting his homeland. 28 ' More-
over, Wakinekona is still in this country and therefore, according to the majority, was not
exiled."' This argument assumes that a prison is a prison and its location is irrelevant, and
ignores Wakinekona's loss of family, friends, and counsel.' k' Justice Marshall limited the
holdings of Meachum and Montanye to intrastate transfers. 2" According to Marshall, these
decisions hold that no liberty interest is implicated by a transfer to a prison where an
inmate could originally have been confinecl, 2" In Marshall's view, whether a prisoner
could be placed initially in a prison far from his homeland without raising a clue process
clause issue is an entirely different question."' The majority opinion erred, as Justice
Marshall pointed out, by not recognizing a difference between intrastate and interstate
transfers.
The decisions of Helms and Ohm narrow the scope of protected liberty interests
stemming from the due process clause. The prisoner faced with a transfer does not have a
protected liberty interest in remaining where he is unless he can demonstrate that the
transfer results in consequences "qualitatively different from the punishment characteris-
tically suffered by a person convicted of crime."'" If no liberty interest is present, the
analysis ends; t he prisoner may be transferred without. any form of procedural protec-
tion. After these two decisions, as long as the transferee's destination is still within a
prison's walls, this test will rarely be met. Transfers are now matters of administrative
choice which can be made for any reason or no reason; the propriety of such transfers will
not be reviewable by the courts.
277 Id .
278
	
Olim, 461 U.S. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "in Hawaii less
than three percent of the state prisoners were transferred to prisons in other jurisdictions in 1979,
and on a nationwide basis less than one percent of the prisoners held in state institutions were
transferred to other jurisdictions." Id.
"" The majority found this argument to be "unpersuasive." Id. at 248 n.9.
2"0 Id. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2
" 1 Id. at 248 n.9 ("The fact that [Wakinekona's] confinement takes place outside Hawaii is
merely a fortuitous consequence of the fact that he must be confined, not an additional element of his
punishment.").
2"2
283 An early recognition of the problems facing the prisoner who suffers a long distance transfer
is found in Keliher v. Mitchell, 250 F. 904, 906-7 (D. Mass. 1916). The court stated:
The transfer of a prisoner, having a wife and young child, from a prison near which
hey reside, and at which they can visit hint, to a distant place of confinement, where
they may well be unable to go, with the result that they may not see him for 10 or 12
years, obviously imposes on him an additional hardship, [citations omitted] and addi-
tional peril. It may result in a loss of that interest in him by his family and friends which
would be maintained if they saw him occasionally, and which furnishes one of his most
powerful incentives to reformation and honest living after his discharge.
Id.
2"4
	 at 253 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2"s
280 Id. at 253-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287 Olim, 461 U.S. at 245 (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493).
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C. Liberty Interest Rooted in State Law
Prior decisions of the Supreme Court held that a state may create a liberty interest
through statutes and regulations, even though the Constitution itself does not provide for
such a liberty interest.'" Once created by the state, the protection of this liberty interest
becomes a matter of federal law. A prisoner cannot be deprived of the interest without
due process protection.'" To understand the Court's decisions in Helms and Ohm, the
cases developing a state-created liberty interest must first he examined.
1. The Case Law Preceding Helms and Ohm
The development of a protected liberty interest for prisoners rooted in state law
began with the Court's decision in Wolff v. McDonnell. 2"0 In Wolff, the Court held that
Nebraska had "created" a liberty interest protected by the due process clause by establish-
ing a right to good time credits and specifying that these credits could be forfeited only
for serious misbehavior. 29 ' While the Court recognized that Nebraska was not compelled
to provide prisoners with good time credits, this right, once created, could not be
arbitrarily abrogated.'" The due process clause, the Court concluded, requires pro-
cedural protection before the state-created liberty interest may be removed.'"
The Wolff Court's concept of a state-created liberty interest was refined in Meachum v.
Fano' and Montanye v. Haymes. 2"5 The Meacham Court acknowledged Wolff and deemed it
still valid law, but did not find any relevant state law creating a liberty interest in that
case.'" Similarly, the Montanye Court, focusing on the paucity of relevant state law, found
no liberty interest involved in an intrastate transfer.'" In these cases, the Court found no
liberty interest rooted in state law because the only relevant statutes simply allowed for
transfers and did not condition them on the occurrence of certain events. 29" On this point,
the Court stated that laws of those states did not provide that transfer would not occur
absent specific acts of misconduct. 299 This absence of a state-created liberty interest
removed the intrastate transfer from the Wolff precedent,"()
Meachum and Montanye did not signal the end of state-created liberty interests for
prisoners, as the Court made clear in a opinion three years later. 30 ' In Greenhohz v.
2" Helms, 459 U.S. at 469.
2" Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491. Determining what procedural protections are due in a particular case
is the second step in the Court's analysis, undertaken only after a liberty interest has been found. For
a description of this process, see infra text accompanying notes 352-83.
290 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
291
 Id. at 557.
292
 Id.
2" Id. at 557-58. The Wolff Court analogized its liberty interest analysis with that of due process
analysis as to property, where "[t]he court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at
some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests." Id. at 558-59 (emphasis
added). See generally Friendly, Hearing, supra note 183, at 1267-87 (1975) (title taken from Wolff
opinion).
427 U.S. 215 (1976).
2" 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
296 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226.
2" Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242.
29"
	 427 U.S. at 226; Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242.
2" Id.
366 Montanye, 427 U.S. at 227.
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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Nebraska Penal Inmates, 302 the Court again found a protectible liberty interest grounded in
state law where one did not exist under the due process clause. In Greenholtz, the inmates
challenged the discretionary powers of the Nebraska Board of Parole.' The Court
reasoned that in Nebraska a prisoner could not be denied parole without due process
protections because the statute provided for release of an inmate absent specific reasons
for continued detention."' This statute, according to the Court, resulted in an expecta-
tion of release in the prisoner and therefore created a protected liberty interest."
A short time after Greenholtz, the Court refined the elements of a state-created liberty
interest. In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Duinschat,' the prisoner complained that he
was denied due process when he was refused commutation of his sentence."' The Court
found no state-created liberty interest because, unlike the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz,
the Connecticut statute did not contain mandatory language such as "shall" and "un-
less."3" Dumschat, therefore, clarified the elements needed to create a liberty interest by
means of state law: explicit language in the state statutes or regulations defining the
obligations of those charged with granting or denying the liberty in question."
Vitek v. Jones , 31 ° the most recent decision by the Court before Helms and Ohm concern-
ing state-created liberty interests of prisoners, demonstrated that the Court still consid-
ered state law to be a viable source of liberty interests. In Vitek, the Court found a liberty
interest rooted in a Massachusetts state statute. 3 " The statute provided that a prisoner
found by a physician to be suffering from a mental disease or defect that cannot be given
proper treatment in prison may be transferred to a mental hospital. 312 This statute, the
Court concluded, gave the prisoner the objective expectation that he would not be
transferred to a mental hospital unless a physician determined that the prisoner suffered
from a mental disease or defect that could not be properly treated in prison. 3 '13 According
to the Court, this objective expectation gave Jones a liberty interest, and therefore such a
transfer could not be made without first providing due process procedural protections."'
Significantly, the Court stressed the notion that once a liberty interest is created, the
procedures necessary are a matter of federal law." In addition, the Court stated that a
state's procedures will not necessarily satisfy federal standarcls. 3 " Once a liberty interest is
found to be present, the Court will proceed to consider independently what process is
352
 Id.
303 Id. at 3.
304 Id. at 11-12.
3" Id. at 12.
30" 452 U.S. 458 (1981). See generally Note, Searching For a Liberty Interest: The Prisoner's Right to
Due Process, 61 NEB. L. REV. 382,382-408 (1982) (analyzing lower court and Supreme Court decisions
in Dumschat).
301 Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 461. Dumschat was not given a written statement as to why his
commutation requests had been repeatedly denied, and the evidence showed that the board had
previously granted relief' to at least 75% of all life term inmates. Id.
3" Id. at 466.
3" See id. at 465.
210 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
Id. at 488-89.
312 Id. at 483 n.l.
313 Id. at 489-90.
3" Id. at 488-91.
31 ' Id. at 490-91. See infra text accompanying notes 352-83.
316
 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 490-91.
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due. 3" Thus, the Vitek decision established that even without implicit due process protec-
tions, a prisoner who has an objective expectation rooted in state law that he will not be
transferred absent specific preconditions has a protected liberty interest. 3"
2. The Helms and Ohm Analysis of Due Process Protections
for State-Created Liberty Interests
In Helms, the prisoner claimed to have been transferred to administrative segregation
without clue process. 313 After the Court dismissed the argument that the prisoner had a
liberty interest direct from the due process clause, it turned to the claim that a liberty
interest had been created by state law.3" While Helms' claim was successful on this point,
the majority seemed reluctant to find a liberty interest."' The Court began its discussion
of whether a protected liberty interest was created with a disclaimer, stating that the
mere fact that Pennsylvania has created a careful procedural structure to regulate the use
of administrative segregation" does not itself create a liberty interest. 322 According to the
majority, "procedural guidelines" alone do not create the requisite objective expectation
necessary for a finding of a liberty interest rooted in state law. 323 Helms was successful,
however, because Pennsylvania had used "language of an unmistakably mandatory
character, namely requiring that certain procedures 'shall', 'will', or 'must' be em-
ployecl."324 This mandatory language, according to the Court, created a liberty interest for
Helms.
As noted by the majority, Helms represents the first case in which a state law dealing
with the daily operation of a prison system was found to create a liberty interest.. 323 At first
glance, this holding might be considered an advance for prisoners in other states facing
transfers. This conclusion does not appear to be correct, however, for two reasons. First,
the procedural structure alone did not create the liberty interest, but rather it was cre-
ated by the specific language outlining the procedures.326 The message from the Court,
therefore, appears to be t hat not all statutes providing procedural guidelines governing
transfers will create a liberty interest, but only those containing "language of an unmis-
takably mandatory character.' Second, the Court expressly discussed reasons why it
should not find a liberty interest in statutes and regulations governing daily operations. 328
According to the Court, deprivations imposed during daily operations are likely to be
317 See id. at 495-96. For a discussion of what process is due once a liberty interest is found, see
infra text accompanying notes 352-83.
313 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488-89.
31 " Helms, 459 U.S. at 462.
320 Id. at 469.
321
 The Court warned that "regulations structuring the authority of prison administrators may
warrant treatment, for purposes of creation of entitlements to 'liberty,' different from statutes or
regulations in other' areas." Id. at 470. This statement suggests that a higher standard may be
required in the next case, or perhaps a complete denial of state-created liberty interests insofar as
transfers are concerned.
322
	
at 471.
"3 Id.
3" Id. ai 471-72.
32a
	 at 469. The Court acknowledged that its summary affirmance of Wright, 434 U.S. 1052
(1978), may be an exception. Helms, 459 U.S. at 469.
326
	 supra note 75 and accompanying text.
3" See Helms, 459 U.S. at 471-72.
ala Id. at 470.
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minor when compared to the deprivations involved in cases such as Wolff and Greenholtz,
where the interests involved were, respectively, good time credits and parole decisions."
In addition, the Court pointed out. that "the safe and efficient operation of a prison on a
day to day basis has traditionally been entrusted to the expertise of prison officials."33°
Later cases may use this reasoning to avoid finding a liberty interest in state statutes and
regulations governing the daily operations of a prison system. Although it is true that the
statute involved in Helms concerned daily operations, it cannot be said with certainty that
the deprivation resulting from such statutes will be "minor." 33 ' The Court's second
justification, that prison operations have traditionally been managed by prison officials,
while true, does not free the courts from taking action when that management fails. As
the Wolff Court acknowledged, the courts have a duty to make sure that prisoners receive
the constitutional rights to which they are entitled.
The majority's opinion may also be criticized for placing too much reliance on
"substantive predicates" and "explicitly mandatory language" for the finding of a liberty
interest." Such reasoning, according to Justice Stevens, hinged the finding of a liberty
interest on a "magical combination" of language. 333 Stevens pointed out in dissent that the
majority's reasoning allows the state to decide which liberty interests to give today and
which to remove tomorrow, 334 Apparently, a change of statutory language from "must" to
"may" will remove a prisoner's protected liberty and thus deny him due process clause
protections prior to his transfer.
As foreshadowed by the decision in Helms, the Court found no protected liberty
interest had been created by the state regulations of Hawaii at issue in Ohm."
Wakinekona had argued that a state regulation requiring that a hearing be provided
before a prison transfer involving a "grievous loss to the inmate" gave rise to a pr'otected
liberty interest. 33° The prison administrators had conceded that Wakinekona suffered a
"grievous loss" within the meaning of the regulation. 337 The regulation provided further
that the hearing will be conducted by an "impartial program committee . . . composed of
at leastthree members who were not actively involved in the process by which the inmate .
.. was brought before the Committee."" Under the regulations, the committee is then in
a position to make recommendations to the prison administrator.' The Hawaii regula-
tions appeared to create an objective expectation that a specific type of hearing would
occur prior to Wakinekona's transfer. The Court, however, found that these regulations
do not create a liberty interest protected by the due process clause." Because the
3" Id. See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wolff Court's finding
of a liberty interest in state law governing good time credits. Seesupra notes 302-05 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the Creenholtz Court's finding of a liberty interest in state law governing
the granting of parole.
33° Helms, 459 U.S. at 470.
3" See supra notes 248 and 251.
332 Helms, 459 U.S. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333 Id.
"4 Id.
ass
	 461 U.S. at 251.
33° See supra note 119.
3" Olim, 461 U.S. at 242 n.l.
aa" Id. at 242.
33° Id.
34° Id. at 248. The approach taken by the Court of Appeals was to focus on the regulations
concerning the committee. Olim, 664 F.2d at 712.
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administrator, according to the statute, is not expressly bound to follow the recommenda-
tion of the committee, the Court reasoned that the Hawaii regulations do not create such
an expectation."' This discretion made the administrator's decision to transfer a prisoner
completely unfettered, in the Court's view, and thus no liberty interest was created."'
In its argument, the majority appeared to misapply precedent. The Court ruled that
this case was governed by Meachum and Montanye, in which no liberty interest was found to
be created where state law allowed prison officials to 'act for any or no reason." 3 In
Meacham and Montanye, however, the state statutes concerning the transfer of prisoners
only allowed for transfers, it did not condition them on the occurrence of specific
events. 344
 As justice Marshall indicated in dissent, Ohm is more properly governed by
Helms because the Hawaii regulations are set out in "language of an unmistakably manda-
tory character."345 The majority relied on the regulations' failure to bind the adminis-
trator- to follow the recommendations of the committee to avoid the creation of a liberty
interest 346
 and attached little significance to the existence of the committee. Although the
final decision by the administrator was discretionary, this discretion did not negate the
function of the committee: to guard against arbitrary decision making. 3" The regulation's
creation of such a committee suggests that the legislature intended it to have a purpose
and not be a meaningless body which the administrator can arbitrarily bypass, avoiding all
clue process limitations.
After the Court's decisions in Helms and Ohm, few lower courts will be likely to find a
341 Contrary to the Court of Appeals' approach, the Supreme Court focused on the regulations
with respect to the administrator. Ohm, 461 U.S. at 242-43. The language rdied on by the Court was:
[The administrator] may, as the final decisionmaker:
(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or
(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or
welfare of the staff, inmate ... , other inmates ... institution, or community and refer
the matter back to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation.
Id. (quoting Rule !V,	 3d(3), of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Corrections
Division, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii).
5" Ohm, 461 U.S. at 249. In reaching its conclusion that the administrator's discretion is
"completely unfettered" the Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Lono v.
Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 621 P.2d 976 (1981). In Lono, with facts almost identical to those in Olim, the
Hawaii Supreme Court focused on the administrator and found no limit on his discretionary power
in "selecting a place of confinement upon a decision to transfer." Id. at 980 (emphasis added).
343 Olim, 461 U.S. at 248-49.
Montanye, 427 U.S. at '242; Meacham, 427 U.S. at 226.
34$
	 at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Marshall, this language indicates
that the standard for classifying inmates requires providing "optimum placement within the Correc-
tions Division" in light of the "best interests of the individual, the State, and the Community." Id. In
addition, Justice Marshall stated that the regulations establish detailed procedures for the Program
Committee hearing that must be held before a transfer' involving a "grievous loss" is made. Id. See also
note 119.
3" Id. at 249-50. ("Because the Administrator is the only decisionmaker under Rule 1V, we need
not decide whether the introductory paragraph of Rule IV, [containing the language that the
standard for classifying inmates is their optimum placement within the Corrections Division' places
any substantive limitations on the purely advisory Program Committee."). The Court also deter-
mined from its finding of no state-created liberty interest that Wakinekona's "claim of bias in the
composition of the prison Program Committee [became] irrelevant." Id. at 251 11.14.
"T The lower court stressed that the administrator can act only after the impartial committee
has acted. The role of the committee is to act as a check on the administrator. Ohm, 664 F.2d at 712
("The regulations certainly do not contemplate a transfer at the will of the prison administrator „
The whole purpose of such procedural requirements is to protect against arbitrary or uninformed
action by the prison administrator.").
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liberty interest rooted in stale law governing either prison-to-prison transfers or transfers
to more restrictive custody. The Court's opinions indicate that the decision to transfer, for
any or no reason, is one that will be made by administrators and will be unreviewable by
the courts. In Helms and Ohm, the Court narrowed the scope of state-created liberty
interests just as it had limited the extent of liberty interests implicit in the due process
clause.
Despite the narrowing trend of the Court, Helms was successful in asserting that a
liberty interest, created by state law, existed in his case. 348 If no liberty interest is found
either directly under the due process clause or under state law, as in Wakinekona's case,
the analysis ends and the Court does not examine the procedures, or lack thereof,
involved. 349 On the other hand, if a liberty interest is found, as in Helms, the Court must
proceed to a second step in its analysis. 35° In this inquiry the Court looks at the liberty
interest present and determines what process is due before it may be removed. 3" The
next section of this casenote will examine this question.
III. AFTER FINDING A LIBERTY INTEREST — WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
After a finding of a protected liberty interest, the Court must then consider what
process is due, as demonstrated in the early prisoners' rights case of Morrissey v. Brewer,
involving parole revocation. 352 The Court set out its basic framework for this determina-
tion in Morrissey. I n Morrissey, the Court noted that due process is a flexible concept and
the procedures required by the Constitution will vary according to the circumstances. 353
The Morrissey Court then used the balancing approach developed in Mathews v. Eklridge 354
to determine what constitutes due process. Under the Eldridge test, the Court must
consider both private and government interests involved. 355 In addition, the Eldridge test
requires the Court to balance the risk that existing procedures will lead to an erroneous
deprivation of the private interest against the probable value of creating any additional or
substantive procedures. 359
Both Helms and Wakinekona claimed to have suffered losses of liberty interests that
warranted due process protections. 357 In Helms, where a protectible liberty interest was
found by the Court, the Court held that the procedures followed satisfied the due process
clause."' Helms was given written notice of the charges against him, and his transfer was
reviewed by a hearing committee five days after he was placed in administrative segrega-
tion. 359 For seven weeks Helms was then kept in administrative segregation pending
completion of an investigation:" Helms received much less procedural protection than
was required in Morrissey, and the Court justified this result by purporting to balance
343 Helms, 459 U.S. at 472.
349 461 U.S. at 251.
35° Helms, 459 U.S. at 472.
351 See infra text accompanying notes 352-83.
352
	 U.S. at 481.
' 53 Id. at 481.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
353 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325.
356
357
	 supra text accompanying notes 246-88 and 319-51.
353 Helms, 459 U.S. at 477.
959 Id.
38°
	 at 464-65.
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interests according to the Mathews formula. Justice Rehnquist determined Helms' private
interests to be minimal; he was "merely transferred from one extremely restricted envi-
ronment to an even more confined situation." 36' In addition, the Court considered the
absence of any stigma attached to being transferred into administrative confinement and
the absence of any effect on parole opportunities as further indicators of the inconse-
quential level of private interests involved. 362 Conversely, the Court viewed the govern-
ment's interests in confining Helms in administrative segregation — insuring the safety of
others, Helms, and witnesses — as substantia1. 363 Finally, the Court considered the third
factor under Mathews, the effect greater procedural protections would have had. On this
point, Justice Rehnquist concluded that decisions to place an inmate in administrative
confinement turn on "purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behav-
ior" which would not be helped by greater procedural safeguards."'
Several weaknesses afflict the majority's reasoning. The record is unclear about
whether Helms was present at the hearing committee review. 365 The majority held that a
written statement by the inmate is adequate to present his views to the committee deciding
whether to transfer him into administrative segregation. 366 Given the educational level of
many prisoners, such an opportunity is meaningless. Justice Stevens, the author of the
dissent, would require that the inmate be given the opportunity to present his views in
person before being transferred into administrative segregation to satisfy due process
requirements
As argued by Justice Stevens, the Court failed to provide protection against arbitrary
continuation of an inmate's administrative confinement The majority, in undertaking
its Mathews balancing, may have been correct in ranking government interests high in
determining what procedure is due before the initial transfer into administrative
confinement is made. As pointed out by Justice Stevens, however, these interests do not
remain valid over time."9 A need exists to re-examine the facts to determine whether the
prisoner should remain in administrative confinement. As more evidence comes to light,
the significance of the third prong of the Mathews test, risk of error weighed against added
procedure, may become more significant. The deciding party at this point will have a
better overall view of the situation and be able to judge more accurately whether the
prisoner should remain in administrative segregation. Finally, as time passes, the private
interests increase.'" The prisoner, kept in a condition far worse than the condition of the
Id. at 473.
362 Id.
36.1
 Id.
364 It at 474.
' 6' Id. at 464.
366 Id. at 476.
367 Id. at 490 (Stevens, J„ dissenting). The majority allowed for the possibility of oral statements,
but did not require them. Id. at 476 ("Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will accomplish
this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in
cases where they believe a written statement would be ineffective.").
' 66 Id. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Wright court concluded that a prisoner confined in
solitary confinement for administrative reasons suffers an even greater deprivation than one
confined for disciplinary reasons. See supra note 248. Among the reasons given was the indefiniteness
of the time period. Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 403.
' 66 Helms, 459 U.S. at 490-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37° Justice Stevens pointed out that "[c]onditions, including Helms' own attitudes, the attitudes
of other prisoners toward him and toward each other, . . . simply do not remain static." Id. at 492
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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general population and with no idea of the reasons for or length of his segregation, will be
anxious to find out why he is being so confined. At this stage, due process does not require
the full elements of a Morrissey-type hearing, because such a hearing should ordinarily be
provided at the end of the investigation before any disciplinary action is taken. Even with
the safeguard of a pre-disciplinary hearing, however, more than "paper-shuffling - should
be required to hold an inmate in administrative segregation for any length of time. 3 "
Justice Stevens suggested that a periodic review take place where the inmate is
present and allowed to explain his attitude and the impact of continued solitary confine-
ment.372 In addition, if' prison officials decide that an investigation should continue and
that the inmate should remain in confinement, a written statement with reasons should be
provided to the prisoner."' These safeguards will protect prisoners such as Helms who,
although holders of a protected liberty interest, are kept in isolation for weeks or months
with no idea as to their status or when t hey might return to the general prison popula-
tion. 37 `
In Ohm, the Court held that Wakinekona did not have a liberty interest protected by
the clue process clause.' As discussed previously, the Court should have held that
protected liberty interests existed in both Helms and Ohm . 376 Had the Court found a liberty
interest, based on either the due process clause or state law, a determination of the
procedural protections would have been necessary before such a transfer would have
been permitted. The balancing approach of Mathews would justify providing Wakinekona
the full range of Morrissey procedures.37 The personal interest at stake in Wakinekona's
case was high — the isolating effect of sending Wakinekona to California was a serious
personal loss to him. On the other hand, the government interests were strictly linancial
and physical—Wakinekona was transferred because the state had nowhere to put him. 378
Procedural requirements could be limited 6y the costs of providing additional protec-
tion. 37y But the State did not claim that it could not afford the cost of a hearing. Rather, it
claimed it did not have the facilities necessary to maintain Wakinekona in Hawaii. 380 A
lack of facilities does not justify changing Wakinekona's classification and transferring
hint without a proper hearing.
What constitutes a fair hearing inside the walls of a prison has been debated by the
courts and comment ators, 38 ' but the approach set out in Morrissey remains a good model
to be used whenever a prisoner faces interstate transfer likely to cause the difficulties
encountered by Wakinekona. An additional issue implicated by requiring that Morrissey
procedures be made available is the issue of whether counsel should be provided at any
"' Id. at 493.
372 Id. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30 Id .
"'I See supra note 248.
"5 Ohm, 461 U.S. at 248.
376 See supra text accompanying notes 246- 87 and 319 - 51.
2" See supra note 211,
3" The program committee report given to Wakinekona read in part as follows: "Since there is
no other Maximum Security prison in Hawaii which can offer you the correctional programs you
require and you cannot remain at [the maximum control unit] because of impending construction of
a new facility, the Program Committee recommends your transfer to an institution on t he mainland."
Ohm, 461 U.S. at 241.
37' Redau, How to Argue About Prisoners' Rights: Some Simple Ways, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 687, 701
(1981).
2"" Olim, 461 U.S. at 241.
351 Tobriner & Cohen, Parolees, supra note 211, at 801 - 11.
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pre-transfer hearings if requested by the prisoner. The argument against providing
counsel is mainly a cost-availability argument, but this argument can be overcome. First,
an interstate transfer requiring due process protection will not be a common event,
limiting the situations calling for counsel . 382
 Indeed, the Court did not find this argument
persuasive in Gagnon, where the interest involved was parole revocation. 383 Second, not
every inmate facing transfer will request counsel, either because the complexity of the
case is not beyond his grasp or he is allowed the assistance of others —"jailhouse lawyers,"
counselors, and the like.
This discussion indicates that in addition to narrowing the scope of liberty interests
for prisoners faced with a transfer, the Court is also now willing to narrow the extent of
the procedures available once a liberty interest is found. Helms, who did have a liberty
interest according to the Court, was given much less protection than the Court provided
in earlier prisoner cases such as Morrissey and Vilek. How much procedure Wakinekona or
future transferred prisoners deserve is unknown because the Court did not reach the
issue in Olin. The Helms decision indicates, however, that even with  liberty interest, a
prisoner may not be guaranteed adequate protection.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, with its recent decisions in Helms and Olim, has retreated from
its pro-prisoner stance of the early 1970's. It has accomplished this retreat both by
narrowing the scope of protected liberty interests found in the due process clause and in
state law, and by limiting the available procedural protections once a liberty interest is
found.
The prisoner faced with an involuntary transfer who hopes to find a protected liberty
interest in the due process clause itself must now make a strong showing of a change
"qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person
convicted of crime." Helms and Olin indicate that so long as the destination of a transfer is
within the walls of a prison, any prison, this test will never be met.
The prisoner faced with an involuntary transfer who hopes to find a protected liberty
interest in state law faces a similar uphill battle. Establishing the existence of such a liberty
interest will require a showing of statutory language clearly limiting the decision maker's
discretion and creating an objective expectation that a transfer will not occur absent
specific preconditions. Such an expectation will not be found in all state statutes govern-
ing transfers. In addition, the Court has indicated that the standard may be higher for
statutes governing the day to day operations of a prison system.
Finally, Helms indicates that the prisoner who does succeed in establishing that a
liberty interest exists will not necessarily obtain the procedural protections formerly
accorded under the case iaw. The Court will now undertake a strict balancing of the
prisoner's interests, the government's interests, and the benefits of greater procedural
protection. Given the Court's present attitude towards due process protections for pris-
oners, the inmate may very well come out on the lighter side of the scales after the
relevant competing considerations are weighed.
THOMAS L. FirculAN
3" Id. at 807-9,
3" Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 778 (1973).
